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We consider a variant of the BB84 protocol for quantum cryptography, the prototype of
tomographically incomplete protocols, where the key is generated by one-way communi-
cation rather than the usual two-way communication. Our analysis, backed by numerical
evidence, establishes thresholds for eavesdropping attacks on the raw data and on the
generated key at quantum bit error rates of 10% and 6.15%, respectively. Both thresholds
are lower than the threshold for unconditional security in the standard BB84 protocol.
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1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography deals with all aspects, both theoretical and experimental,
of schemes, or “protocols,” for quantum key distribution. When implementing a
quantum key distribution protocol, the two parties — Alice and Bob — exploit
the laws of quantum mechanics to gain a string of perfectly secure key bits for
subsequent one-time-pad encryption of a private message.
The first such protocol, the celebrated BB84 protocol, was proposed by Ben-
nett and Brassard in 1984.1 In this brief report, we study raw-data attacks on this
protocol in an “Ekert setting,” where eavesdropper Eve is given the privilege of
sending entangled qubits to Alice and Bob. This setting is equivalent to the tradi-
tional scenario where Alice sends qubits to Bob, and Eve performs a cloning attack
on the qubits in transmission.
Alice and Bob concede to the fact that there will always be noise in their channel,
but they only accept unbiased noise. Now, owing to the incomplete-tomographic
nature of this protocol, Eve is free to send a family of states, with each of them
appearing the same to Alice and Bob. For them, this state is only parameterized
by one parameter, the amount of noise they see. We ask this question: which state
should Eve send to Alice and Bob such that she maximizes her accessible informa-
tion relative to Alice?
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We restrict the discussion to the case where the state Eve sends is symmetric
between Alice and Bob. For all such states, a von Neumann type measurement
that satisfies the necessary conditions for an optimal POVM — in the sense of
maximizing the mutual information — is given. But even in this restricted case we
cannot prove that the POVM found is globally optimal. As usual2 we can verify
that we found a local optimum, but any claim on global optimality must rely on a
thorough numerical search with negative outcome.
A plausible, self-suggesting answer to that question would be for Eve to send a
state to Alice and Bob such that it has maximal entropy. But it turns out that this
is not always her best choice. Rather, when attacking the raw data Eve should send
the state with the largest degree of separability, or smallest concurrence. From the
information that is then accessible to Eve, we deduce the security threshold for the
raw-data attacks.
2. Partial tomography
The scenario we shall be discussing is as follows: Alice and Bob are promised a
sequence of singlets from Eve, an entangled qubit pair provider of dubious reliability.
Due to practical imperfections in their channel, they compromise with an unbiased-
noise statea
ρAB = (1− ǫ) |φ1〉 〈φ1|+ ǫ
4
. (1)
Here |φ1〉 is the singlet state, and 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 characterizes the amount of noise
in the channel; the “quantum bit error rate” that is used to quantify the noise
in the standard BB84 protocol equals 12ǫ. Alice and Bob independently perform
measurements in two complementary bases, the x and z basis, each with equal
probability. The decision of whether to carry out the measurement in the x or z
basis is made at random.
To check the reliability of the source they received, Alice and Bob sacrifice a
fraction of their qubits to verify that the joint probability table of their measure-
ments is consistent with (1), i.e., they check that their joint probability table looks
like Table 1. The quantum version3 of the de Finetti theorem ensures that the qubit
pairs received from the source behave like statistically independent pairs. There-
fore, the joint probabilities of Table 1 tell Alice and Bob the statistical properties of
those pairs as far as measurements in the x and z bases are concerned, but there is
no information about the y bases. Accordingly, the “state tomography” performed
by Alice and Bob in this manner is incomplete, or partial.
Alice and Bob, being paranoid, assume that the noise in (1) is an artifact of Eve’s
eavesdropping on their communication. So, if the probability table they obtain is
aIn practice, Alice and Bob would not expect to receive such a state with perfectly unbiased
noise. However, they can include a controlled effective source of noise in their apparatus, by post-
processing the measured data, and so bring any state they receive to the unbiased-noise state.
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Table 1. Joint probability table between
Alice and Bob who communicate with each
other to check that the statistical proper-
ties of their measurement results are con-
sistent with this table.
Bob Alice
z+ z− x+ x−
z+
ǫ
16
2− ǫ
16
1
16
1
16
z−
2− ǫ
16
ǫ
16
1
16
1
16
x+
1
16
1
16
ǫ
16
2− ǫ
16
x−
1
16
1
16
2− ǫ
16
ǫ
16
skewed, or if they find that the noise level ǫ is too large, Alice and Bob abandon their
communication. Otherwise they will use the correlations in their data to establish
a cryptographic key for one-time-pad encryption.
By means of the partial tomography, Alice and Bob establish the values of eight
independent parameters of their joint two-qubit state. Explicitly, if we write the
two-qubit state between Alice and Bob as
ρAB =
1
4
3∑
j,k=0
cjkσj ⊗ σk , (2)
where σ0 = 1 and σj are the three Pauli matrices, the tomographic constraint of
consistency with (1) imposes eight constraints on the coefficients cjk = 〈σj ⊗ σk〉,
c01 = c03 = c10 = c30 = c13 = c31 = 0 and
c11 = c33 = −(1− ǫ) . (3)
With c00 = 1 for normalization, there remain seven parameters that are inacces-
sible to Alice and Bob who, therefore, can ascertain the state they receive only
partially. Hence we speak of partial tomography. The remaining seven parameters
are independent and are constrained only by the positivity of ρAB.
This is in contrast to, say, the “six-state protocol” or the “minimal qubit proto-
col” where Alice and Bob perform full tomography.4,5 There they can check all 15
parameters of their joint two-qubit state, and tomography uniquely characterizes
the state. In addition to (3), Alice and Bob then have the luxury of insisting on
c02 = c20 = c12 = c21 = c23 = c32 = 0
and c22 = −(1− ǫ) (4)
as well.
In the partially tomographic BB84 protocol, these parameters are hidden from
Alice and Bob. A whole family of distinct states appears equivalent to them. They
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would be wise to assume that Eve uses her freedom to manipulate these hidden
parameters to her full advantage.
As the scheme in the BB84 protocol goes, Alice and Bob would reveal publicly
the bases of their independent measurements. After this announcement, qubit pairs
measured in mismatched bases are discarded, while the qubit pairs in matched bases
give them a string of sifted data with stronger correlations. In the absence of noise,
these sifted data would have perfect correlations, and the resulting key is guaranteed
to be secure. However, in the presence of noise, a shorter but still perfectly secure
key can still be distilled by means of classical error correcting codes and privacy
amplification.
But Alice and Bob can just as well device a protocol that uses the raw data
itself; that is, they exploit the correlations available directly from Table 1 to distill
the same amount of secure key bits. Alice and Bob then need not announce their
measurement bases. In the subsequent analysis, it is about this raw data that eaves-
dropper Eve wishes to learn. This is equivalent to Eve attempting to eavesdrop on
the sifted data if she does not have the means to store her ancilla qubits until after
Alice and Bob will have announced their choice of bases.
According to the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner theorem6 of classical information theory, this
amount of distillable secure key is measured by the difference in the Shannon’s
mutual information between Alice and Bob and between Alice and Eve. The mutual
information between Alice and Bob is
IAB(ǫ) =
1
2
Φ (1− ǫ) , (5)
where
Φ (x) =
1
2
[
(1− x) log (1− x) + (1 + x) log (1 + x)] . (6)
3. Constraints on Eve
Eve creates an entangled four-qubit state
|ΨABE〉 =
4∑
j=1
|φj〉 |Ej〉 , (7)
where the unnormalized kets |Ej〉 are the four two-qubit states of her ancilla which
record the outcomes of Alice and Bob’s measurements, and
|φ1〉
|φ2〉
}
=
(
|z+〉 |z−〉 ∓ |z−〉 |z+〉
) 1√
2
and
|φ3〉
|φ4〉
}
=
(
|z+〉 |z+〉 ± |z−〉 |z−〉
) 1√
2
(8)
are the four Bell states, which we use as the basis states for the qubit pair received
by Alice and Bob. The two-qubit state obtained by performing a partial trace over
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Eve’s ancilla,
ρAB = TrE
{
|ΨABE〉 〈ΨABE|
}
, (9)
is what Eve sends to Alice and Bob. The geometry of Eve’s ancilla states are fully
determined by ρAB, the state Eve chooses, and the free choice of basis we used for
Alice and Bob in writing (7). With ρAB in the form of (2), Eve is thus constrained
by the values of cjk in (3).
4. Raw-data attacks
Eve’s task is to maximize the mutual information between Alice and herself. For
every state ρAB that Eve chooses to send, she has a corresponding optimal POVM
that maximizes her mutual information. Hence hers is a double optimization prob-
lem: first, she has to find the best POVM and, second, she has to choose the most
advantageous values for the seven adjustable coefficients that do not appear in (3).
The optimal POVM depends, of course, on the parameter choice.
The optimization has to be done with respect to Eve’s four input states. They
are the ancilla states conditioned on Alice measuring z± or x±. Each of these states
has rank two.
In practice, Eve does not have to make use of ancillas for an attack on the raw
data. Once she decides which POVM to use on her ancillas, she can trace out her
subsystem from the state (7) conditioned on her intended POVM outcomes. The
remaining ensemble of states would then give the pre-manufactured states that Eve
should send to Alice and Bob.
We restrict our study to the symmetric case of c02 = c20 = c12 = c21 = c23 =
c32 = 0, where ρAB is symmetric under the interchange of Alice and Bob, and all
expectation values cjk = 〈σj⊗σk〉 vanish if either σj = σ2 or σk = σ2 but not both.
Although there exist subspaces outside the symmetric region where the accessed
information equals the accessed information in the symmetric region, numerical
simulations suggest strongly that Eve has no advantage from nonsymmetric states.
In this symmetric regime, then, Eve’s four ancilla states in the basis specified
by (7) are mutually orthogonal,
〈Ej |Ek〉 = δjk〈Ej |Ej〉 , (10)
so that the right-hand side of (7) is the Schmidt decomposition of |ΨABE〉, and ρAB
is a weighted sum of projectors on the Bell states (8) with the weights given by
〈E1|E1〉 = 1
4
(3− 2ǫ− c22) ,
〈E2|E2〉 = 〈E4|E4〉 = 1
4
(1 + c22) ,
〈E3|E3〉 = 1
4
(−1 + 2ǫ− c22) . (11)
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Fig. 1. The shaded area indicates the region of permissible values of c22 so that ρAB is positive.
In the darker shaded region, ρAB is separable. The straight line a corresponds to the state that
Eve would be restricted to if she were forced to send the state (1), which is the case when Alice
and Bob perform complete tomography. For c22 values on curve b, Eve sends a maximum-entropy
state to Alice and Bob. The thick line c gives the maximum-separability state for a fixed ǫ < 1/2.
Along line d, where c22 = 0, Eve can have 1/2 bits of mutual information with Alice. Since the
accessible information decreases with |c22|, the lines c and d provide Eve with the largest accessible
information.
The positivity of ρAB thus requires
−1 ≤ c22 ≤ 2ǫ− 1 , (12)
which identifies the shaded area in Figure 1.
The reduced ancilla states that are conditioned on Alice getting one of her four
measurement results z+, z−, x+, or x− are then given by
ρz± =
(|E1〉 ± |E2〉)(〈E1| ± 〈E2|)+ (|E3〉 ± |E4〉)(〈E3| ± 〈E4|) ,
ρx± =
(|E1〉 ∓ |E4〉)(〈E1| ∓ 〈E4|)+ (|E2〉 ± |E3〉)(〈E2| ± 〈E3|) , (13)
each of them occurring with probability 14 . It is thus Eve’s task to discriminate
between these states as best as she can, by a suitable POVM, whereby the figure
of merit is the accessed information, equal to the mutual information between Eve
and Alice that results from the chosen POVM.
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5. POVMs that maximize the mutual information
The mutual information that Eve achieves is maximized, at least locally, by a von
Neumann measurement composed of the projectors to the following kets:
|P1〉
|P2〉
}
= |E1〉 1√
3− 2ǫ− c22
± |E2〉
√
3− 2ǫ− c22
1− c222
− |E3〉 i√
2ǫ− 1− c22
∓ |E4〉 i
√
2ǫ− 1− c22
1− c222
and
|P3〉
|P4〉
}
= |E1〉 1√
3− 2ǫ− c22
± |E2〉 i
√
2ǫ− 1− c22
1− c222
+ |E3〉 i√
2ǫ− 1− c22
∓ |E4〉
√
3− 2ǫ− c22
1− c222
. (14)
The mutual information obtained from this POVM is
IAE =
1
2
Φ
(√
1− c222
)
, (15)
independent of ǫ.
In fact, this POVM is not the only one that attains this mutual information.
Since Eve’s conditioned ancilla states (13) have real coefficients in the basis of the
|Ej〉 kets, the complex conjugate of (14) gives exactly the same mutual information.
And so does any convex combination of these two POVMs, although the members
of the so-formed POVM are no longer of rank one. In particular, an equal-weight
combination gives an optimal POVM with real coefficients. Consult Ref. 2 for more
details about this matter.
Eve makes use of her freedom to select any c22 value within the limits of (12)
such that IAE is largest. This amounts to choosing the smallest permissible value
of |c22|. For ǫ ≥ 12 , this is c22 = 0, giving the straight line (d) in Fig. 1; for ǫ ≤ 12
the best choice is c22 = −(1− 2ǫ), which traces out line (c) in Fig. 1.
Accordingly, Eve has
IAE(ǫ) =
{
1
2Φ
(
2
√
ǫ(1− ǫ)
)
for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 12 ,
1
2 for
1
2 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 ,
(16)
after optimizing the value of c22. The comparison with IAB(ǫ) of (5) then implies
that the BB84 protocol is secure under raw-data attacks when ǫ < 15 , which corre-
sponds to a quantum bit error rate of 10%.
Figure 2 shows IAE(ǫ) for the c22 values along curves a, b, and c in Fig. 1, for
the relevant range of 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 12 . Also shown is IAB(ǫ) of (5), which decreases as ǫ
increases.
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Fig. 2. The decreasing function shows the mutual information IAB between Alice and Bob as
given in (5). Curve a gives Eve’s accessible information (15) when she honestly sends the unbiased-
noise state (1). Eve is restricted to this if Alice and Bob were to perform complete tomography
on their states. Curve b plots Eve’s accessible information when she sends a state with maximum
entropy, and curve c applies when she sends the state with the largest degree of separability, or
the smallest concurrence, and thus achieves the optimum of (16). The curves a, b, and c intersect
Alice and Bob’s mutual information at ǫ = 1 −
√
1/2 = 0.2929, ǫ = 1−
√√
5/4 − 1/2 = 0.2138,
and ǫ = 1/5 = 0.2000, respectively. — The dashed curve shows I
(HSW)
AE (ǫ) of (20).
6. Largest degree of separability, smallest concurrence
As is clearly shown by Figs. 1 and 2, Eve’s best choice for c22 does not amount to
sending the unbiased-noise state (1) to Alice and Bob, for which c22 = −(1− ǫ), nor
the two-qubit state with the largest entropy, for which c22 = −(1− ǫ)2.7 Rather,
Eve sends the state with the largest degree of separability S, a quantity intro-
duced by Lewenstein and Sanpera,8 and the smallest value of the Hill–Wootters
concurrence C.9
For the two-qubit state ρAB under consideration, which is diagonal in the Bell-
state basis of (8) and thus “self-transposed” in the terminology of Ref. 10, one
has
S = min
{
1, ǫ+
1
2
(
1 + c22
)}
,
C = max
{
0,
1
2
(
1− c22
)− ǫ} , (17)
so that S + C = 1 and maximizing S is tantamount to minimizing C. For other
families of states, however, different states may realize the largest S value and the
smallest C value. Since the self-transposed states do not offer a clue, we leave it as
a moot point which of the two quantities is the crucial one.
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7. Maximal entropy
The POVM of Sec. 5 and the thresholds of Fig. 2 apply when it is Eve’s objective
to gain maximal knowledge about Alice’s measurement results, for each qubit pair
sent to Alice and Bob. In other words, Eve is attacking the raw data that have the
correlations of Table 1.
These correlations are turned into a cryptographic key by a suitable error-
correcting code for one-way communication from Alice to Bob. For this purpose,
the measurement results are identified with the letters of an alphabet — such as
(z+, z−, x+, x−)=̂(A,B,C,D) for Alice and (z+, z−, x+, x−)=̂(B,A,D,C) for Bob
— and the code words are sequences of A, B, C, and D. Alice chooses at random
one of the code words and informs Bob, over a public channel, which of her measure-
ment results make up the code words (“Listen, it’s qubits 101, 17, 53, 2674, . . . ”).
Bob’s corresponding measurement results constitute the received word, which he
can then decode to the code word Alice sent. The sequence of transmitted code
words, or perhaps a single very long code word, are then the key for the one-time-
pad encryption.
Clearly, Eve is much more interested in this key than in the raw data from
which it is generated. If she has the technical means for storing her ancillas, she
will not measure them until after Alice has publicly announced the qubit pairs that
contribute to the code words. Only then will Eve measure the respective ancillas
jointly, thereby gaining more information per qubit pair, possibly as much as the
Holevo–Schumacher–Westmoreland bound11 grants,
I
(HSW)
AE = S(ρE)−
1
4
∑
α=
{
z±
x±
S(ρα) , (18)
where
ρE =
1
4
∑
α
ρα =
4∑
j=1
∣∣Ej〉〈Ej∣∣ (19)
is the over-all ancilla state, and S(ρ) = −tr{ρ log2 ρ} is the von Neumann entropy
in units of bits. The non-zero eigenvalues of each ρα are 1 − 12ǫ and 12ǫ, and the
eigenvalues of ρE are the probabilities of (11), so that I
(HSW)
AE is readily evaluated.
Since S(ρα) does not depend on c22, the c22 value for which I
(HSW)
AE is largest,
is the value for which ρE has maximal entropy. It is also the c22 value for which
ρAB has maximal entropy because ρE and ρAB are unitarily equivalent. As stated
above, this happens for c22 = −(1− ǫ)2. Then
I
(HSW)
AE (ǫ) = 1− Φ(1 − ǫ) = 1− 2IAB(ǫ) , (20)
so that the corresponding threshold value for ǫ is determined by IAB(ǫ) =
1
3 . This
gives ǫ = 0.1230, or a quantum bit error rate of 6.15%, as is illustrated by the
dashed curve in Fig. 2.
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8. Conclusion
We have considered quantum key distribution from the raw-data correlations of the
BB84 scheme by one-way communication, and have established the noise thresholds
for eavesdropping attacks on the raw data and on the generated key. Owing to the
incomplete state tomography in the BB84 scenario, Eve can choose the two-qubit
state she sends to Alice and Bob from a seven-parameter family. Our analysis
invokes a plausible symmetry conjecture, which is unproven as yet but backed by
numerical evidence, namely that Eve can restrict herself to sending self-transposed
states to Alice and Bob, which have only one free parameter.
We find that the noise threshold for the raw-data attack is ǫ = 15 , which Eve
achieves by distributing the two-qubit state with the smallest concurrence, or the
largest degree of separability, to Alice and Bob. By contrast, the ultimate attack on
the generated key is most powerful when the two-qubit state with maximal entropy
is sent, and the resulting threshold is at ǫ = 0.1230. The corresponding quantum
bit error rates, after the bases matching in the standard BB84 protocol, are 10%
and 6.15%, respectively. Comparison with the accepted threshold for unconditional
security for BB84, about 12.4%,12 thus establishes that the key extraction by two-
way communication (bases matching etc.) is advantageous for Alice and Bob.
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